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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
only to protect the quality of appeal, but also to grant the defendant the same
right of appeal in quantitative terms. It would be impossible to resolve the
debate as to which viewpoint guarantees, in the constitutional sense, the right
of review, but when prosecuted at public expense, should this right be completely
unlimited? The majority best answers this in stating that "due process and
equal protection imposed no obligation on the State to accord a purposeless
activity a constitutionally protected status."5
R.A.O.
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION DETERMINED ACCORDING TO NEW YORK STATUTE
Section 1941 of the Penal Code of New York provides that one convicted of
a felony in New York is to be punished as a multiple felony offender if he was
previously "convicted . . . under the laws of any other state . . . of a crime
which, if committed within this state, would be a felony." '51
In the case of People ex rel. Goldman v. Denno,52 the Court was faced with
the following facts. The prisoner was convicted of a felony in New York, and
was sentenced to fifteen years to life, pursuant to Section 1941, as a third
felony offender. In a prisoner's habeas corpus proceeding, Goldman sought a
resentencing since the felonies for which he was convicted prior to the felony
in point would not have constituted felonies if committed within New York.
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's dismissal, concluding that
only one of the three prior convictions was a felony for purposes of harsher
punishment.
53
The appeal to the highest court in New York occasioned a restatement of
the applicable rules for determining whether a foreign jurisdiction's conviction
was for a crime which would be a felony if committed in New York. The rule
was stated that if one is convicted for violation of a statute under which the act
or acts prohibited would be felonies in New York, then the party will be
considered a felony offender. But, if the statute under which the party is
convicted prohibits acts, some of which constitute felonies in New York, and
some of which constitute misdemeanors, an inquiry must be made into the
indictment to determine whether the charged acts would have been felonious in
New York. If the indictment alleges acts, some of which would be felonies and
others which would be misdemeanors, then the conviction may not be regarded
as a felony for purposes of determining punishment.
The Court agreed that two of the prior convictions were not properly
felonies under New York law. The Court divided on the character of a 1947
conviction under the Federal Narcotics Statutes. These statutes provide that
one will be guilty of a felony if he receives, conceals, sells or facilitates the
transportation, concealment, and sale of a narcotic drug; 54 whereas, the New
50. Supra note 39.
91. N.Y. Penal Law § 1941(2).
52. 9 N.Y.2d 138, 211 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1961).
53. 9 A.D.2d 955, 196 N.Y.S.2d (2d Dep't 1959).
54. 21 U.S.C. §§ 173, 174.
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York statute makes the sale of narcotics, or possession with intent to sell, the
only felony. Since according to the rules stated above, the appellant could
not be considered a felony offender on the basis of a conviction under a statute
which forbids acts which are both felonies and misdemeanors in New York, the
Court was compelled to make an examination of the indictment. It charged the
several acts forbidden by the statute, including those which are only mis-
demeanors in this State. The Court divided on a single point: in the 1947
conviction, the clerk of the court, did not recite the entire indictment when
reading the charge, but shortened it to "charges you with an unlawful sale."
The accused pleaded guilty, and the court below held that such a plea was
specifically addressed to the recited charge, which would be a felony in New
York. The Court here, in a four to three decision, has held that the indictment
is the only charge to which the accused does or may admit guilt, and not to any
statement of the clerk. It follows that his conviction was not solely for sale of
narcotics, and according to the rules above, it cannot be considered a prior
conviction for purposes of Section 194.1 5
The dissent agrees with the rules as set out by the majority, but has
construed the 1947 conviction in a manner different from that of the majority.
The plea of guilty, as seen by the dissent, was to that part of the indictment
which charged a sale of narcotics, since it was that part which the clerk chose to
recite, and seemingly that part which the accused answered to when he said
"guilty."
The dissent points out that the judgment and commitment of the United
States District Court states that the appellant was convicted of the sale of
heroin. The answer which can be read from the majority is that the fact that
the court chose to so limit its words does not relax the rule that a plea of guilty
is to an indictment, and not to the statement of a clerk. Freedom is too dear
to be taken because of such a procedural mishap.
The result in this case, that the appellant be remanded for resentencing
as a first felony offender, will no doubt substantially reduce the term of
imprisonment. This strikes at the very conscience of the casual reader, for we
see that a "bad man" is getting away with something. The Court states that
"the rules ... have been laid down for application in cases involving the worst,
as well as the best, of men.1
57
The case is certainly a prime example of the inequities brought about by
our many-sided standards of criminal justice, as many sided as there are
jurisdictions. The fact remains that the appellant, Goldman, who has been
convicted of selling, and receiving, and concealing and facilitating the trans-
portation, concealment and sale of a narcotic, will now receive a punishment
55. Supra note 51.
56. Supra note 52 at 143, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
57. Ibid.
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less than that which he would receive had he been indicted only for selling
narcotics.
W. L.
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION REVERSED IN ABSENCE OF ANY STATUTE AUTHOR-
IZING PUNISHMENT FOR OFFENSE CHARGED
In People v. Chopak,58 defendant had pleaded guilty to an information
charging her with maintaining substandard temperatures in two rooms of each
of two apartments owned by a corporation of which she was president. The
offense to which she had pleaded guilty was created by Section 131.03 of the
Health Code of New York City.
59
Defendant does not, on this appeal, question her guilt of the offense
charged, but rather the power of the court, in the absence of an authorizing
statute, to sentence or punish her for such offense. Although punishment for a
violation of Section 131.03 is presently authorized by Section 102-c of the
New York Criminal Courts Act,6 0 defendant is correct in her contention that
no such authorization expressly existed at the time the offense was committed.
Former Section 102-C, in force on the date of the offense charged, merely
provided punishment for violations of Section 225 of the New York City
Sanitary Code0 ' but made no mention of Section 131.03 of the Health Code.
The State contends that Section 131.03 of the Health Code, which had prior
to this offense been substituted by the New York City Board of Health for
Section 225 of the Sanitary Code, was merely a re-enactment of the latter, and
that, therefore, the reference in former Section 102-c to the Sanitary Code
(Section 225) must, of necessity, be considered as a reference to its successor
(Section 131.03 of the Health Code).
There is no question that Section 131.03 of the Health Code was intended
as a substitute for Section 225 of the Sanitary Code. The more difficult question
is whether it (Section 131.03 of Health Code) was a re-enactment of Section 225
of the Sanitary Code. If so, it appears clear that the State must prevail, for,
as stated in Section 80 of the General Construction Law: "If any provision of
a law be repealed and, in substance, re-enacted, a reference in any law to such
repealed provision shall be deemed a reference to such re-enacted provision."62
The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the State's argument and reversed
the conviction against defendant. The Court held that Section 131.03 of the
Health Code, which raised the lowest permissible temperature three degrees
Fahrenheit, was not a re-enactment of Section 225 of the Sanitary Code and,
therefore, the lower court lacked the power to punish defendant for the offense
committed. The Court's conclusion is given weight by their observance of the
58. 9 N.Y.2d 184, 213 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
59. Hereafter referred to as the Health Code.
60. N.Y. Crim. Cts. Act § 102-C.
61. Hereafter referred to as the Sanitary Code.
62. N.Y. Gen. Construction Law § 80.
